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Abstract 
We investigate whether hospitals in the English National Health Service increase their quality 
(mortality, emergency readmissions, patient reported outcome, and patient satisfaction) or 
efficiency (bed occupancy rate, cancelled operations, and cost indicators) in response to an increase 
in quality or efficiency of neighbouring hospitals.  We estimate spatial cross-sectional and panel data 
models, including spatial cross-sectional instrumental variables.  Hospitals generally do not respond 
ƚŽŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?This suggests the absence of spillovers across hospitals in 
quality and efficiency dimensions and has policy implications, for example, in relation to allowing 
hospital mergers. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C21, C23, I11, L3, L11 
Keywords: quality, efficiency, hospitals, competition, spatial econometrics 
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1. Introduction 
Quality and efficiency are fundamental goals for policymakers in the hospital sector.  In the presence 
of fixed prices, policymakers have argued that competition policies may induce hospitals to compete 
on quality to attract patients, and to enhance efficiency (Gaynor, 2007). 
 
A number of studies have investigated the effect of competition on quality and efficiency in the US, 
the United Kingdom, and other OECD countries with mixed results (section 1.1).  The traditional 
approach involves relating quality and efficiency to a measure of market structure (e.g. Herfindahl 
index).  In this study, we use an alternative approach and examine hospitals ? strategic interactions. 
We investigate whether hospitals respŽŶĚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ, i.e. whether 
quality and efficiency are strategic complements or strategic substitutes in the sense that an 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ (efficiency) induces a hospital to increase or reduce its quality (efficiency). 
 
The strategic relationship amongst neighbouring hospitals is important, for example, in relation to 
hospital mergers.  Brekke et al. (2016) provide a theoretical analysis on hospital mergers and their 
effect on quality and efficiency.  They show that if two hospitals merge these will reduce quality.  
The merger will also reduce quality in non-merging rival hospitals if qualities are complements. 
Merging hospitals, moreover, are likely to increase efficiency.  Non-merging rival hospitals will 
increase efficiency if efficiencies are strategic complements. 
 
We consider both clinical and non-clinical (e.g. amenities) dimensions of quality.  Hospital level of 
clinical measures are increasingly available in the public domain (e.g. through websites) as part of 
patient choice policies.  We measure clinical quality through risk-adjusted overall mortality and 
readmission rates, and mortality rates for high-volume conditions such as hip fracture and stroke. 
Mortality and readmissions rates do not however capture health gains for the vast majority of 
patients who do not die or are readmitted as an emergency.  We therefore also measure health 
gains for hip replacement, a common elective procedure, based on patients-reported outcomes 
(PROMs).  We capture non-clinical dimensions of patients ? experience using patient satisfaction with 
overall hospital experience, hospital cleanliness, and the extent to which clinicians involved the 
patients in the treatment decision.  We measure hospital efficiency through indicators for bed 
occupancy, cancelled elective operations, and cost indices for overall hospital activity, elective and 
non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. 
 
We first test for spatial dependence across these quality and efficiency indicators by global Moran ?Ɛ/
test.  We find evidence of positive spatial dependence for several but not all quality and efficiency 
indicators.  We then estimate spatial cross-sectional models by quasi-maximum likelihood (ML) 
controlling for observable determinants of quality and efficiency.  To control for unobserved time-
invariant determinants of quality and efficiency, we estimate spatial panel models.  Finally, we adopt 
two spatial cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) approaches.  In all models, our key coefficient 
of interest is the spatial lag of the dependent variable.  A positive estimate implies strategic 
complementarity in quality or efficiency.  Our key finding is that cross-sectional and panel data 
estimates of the spatial lag mostly suggest the absence of strategic interaction across rival hospitals 
in quality and efficiency. 
 
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 review the literature and the institutional background.  Section 2 sketches a 
theoretical model.  Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy.  Section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 
discusses the results, and section 6 concludes. 
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1.1. Related literature 
Our study relates to the literature on hospital competition and, more broadly, to spatial 
econometrics applications in health economics.  Early studies focus on the relationship between 
hospital competition and efficiency in the US.  They show that non-price competition combined with 
a cost-based reimbursement system may lead to overprovision of hospital services (e.g. Joskow, 
1980, Robinson and Luft, 1985).  Later studies find a beneficial effect of price competition on costs 
(e.g. Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988, Bamezai et al., 1999).  Other studies focus on the impact of 
hospital competition on quality, providing mixed results.  They find that competition improves 
(Kessler and McClellan, 2000, Kessler and Geppert, 2005), decreases (Gowrisankaran and Town, 
2003) or is not associated (Mukamel et al., 2001) with clinical quality as measured by mortality. 
 
Studies that analyse the effect of hospital competition on quality and efficiency in the UK also have 
mixed results.  Some suggest that competition increases (Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) or 
is not associated with efficiency (Söderlund et al., 1997).  Other studies find either negative (Propper 
et al., 2004, Propper et al., 2008), positive (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 
2015), or mixed impact of competition on quality (Gravelle et al., 2014a). 
 
This study builds on the spatial approach proposed by Mobley (2003) and Mobley et al. (2009). 
These authors focus on strategic complementarity in prices, rather than quality, within the US 
context where hospital prices are not fixed.  Similarly, Choné et al. (2014) study strategic 
complementarity of GWƐ ?prices in France using a spatial IV approach.  Gravelle et al. (2014b) use a 
cross section of English data and find that seven out of sixteen clinical and patient-reported quality 
dimensions are strategic complements. 
 
We improve on previous spatial econometric papers in three ways: first, we employ efficiency 
measures in addition to quality; second, we employ panel data to control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity through hospital fixed effects; third, we address potential endogeneity 
owing to other sources of unobserved factors through two IV approaches. 
 
Our study contributes to the small literature on spatial econometrics applications in health 
economics.  For instance, Moscone et al. (2007) study spatial spillovers in mental health expenditure 
in England and find that neighbouring mental health authorities interact in their expenditure 
decisions.  Gaughan et al. (2015) test spillover effects on delayed discharges and find that more care 
home beds and younger patients in nearby local authorities reduce delayed discharge.  Moscone and 
Tosetti (2014) provide a comprehensive review of spatial econometrics applications in health 
economics. 
 
1.2. Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) is universal, tax financed, and free at the point of use.  The 
Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 local health authorities which use 
it to pay for secondary health care provided to NHS patients by public and private hospitals.  Public 
hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, the latter having greater financial 
autonomy.  Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts providing research and teaching, and some 
are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of conditions or client groups. 
 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff Payment 
System.  This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient classification system similar 
to the American Diagnosis-Related Group or DRG.  The HRGs categorise patients into homogeneous 
groups depending on diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics.  A fixed tariff is 
calculated for each HRG group as its national cost averaged across providers but with adjustments 
for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the higher costs of 
specialised care (Department of Health, 2013). 
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Under such a fixed-price regime, hospital competition has been encouraged by allowing elective 
patients to choose where to be treated.  TŚĞ ? ? ? ? ‘WĂƚŝĞŶƚŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƌĞĨŽƌŵ initially allowed patients 
to choose amongst four or five providers, with the choice extended to any qualified provider from 
2008 (Department of Health, 2009).  WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŝƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚthe website  ‘E,^
ŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐ ) ? 
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2. Theoretical model 
We sketch a simple two provider model of quality competition and cost reducing effort.  Hospital i 
has demand function  ,i i jD q q  which is increasing in own quality and decreasing in the quality of 
hospital j. The objective function of hospital i is: 
 
      , ; , ; , ;i i i i i i i j i i i i iU p c q e D q q G q eT T T  ª º¬ ¼      (1) 
 
where p is the fixed price per treatment that the hospital receives from a third-party payer. 
 ,i i ic q e  and  ,i i iG q e  are variable and fixed treatment costs, respectively, which are increasing in 
quality and decreasing in cost-containment effort or efficiency ie .  We assume that quality and 
effort are substitutes in fixed costs, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
G q e ! , since both are types of managerial effort. 
To keep computations simple, we assume that quality and efficiency are instead independent in 
variable costs, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
c q e  . iT  is a vector of shift parameters (such as local input prices, 
population demographics, and morbidity).  The subscripts iq  and ie  indicate the partial derivative 
with respect to these choice variables. 
 
Hospital i chooses quality and efficiency to satisfy: 
 
     , ; ( , ; ) , ; ( , ; ) , ; 0
i i i iiq i i i i iq i j i iq i i i i i j i iq i i iU p c q e D q q c q e D q q G q eT T T T T     ª º¬ ¼  (2) 
 
      , ; , ; , ; 0
i i iie ie i i i i i j i ie i i iU c q e D q q G q eT T T        (3) 
 
where 0
iiq
D ! , 0
iiq
c ! , and 0
iiq
G ! . With strictly concave utility functions these conditions are 
also sufficient.  Note that the price must exceed the marginal cost of treating additional patients if 
the hospital is to be induced to provide positive quality.  The optimal quality is determined such that 
the marginal profit from higher additional demand is equal to the marginal cost of quality.  The 
optimal level of efficiency (cost-containment effort) is such that the marginal benefit from lower 
costs and higher profits are equal to the marginal disutility from efficiency. 
 
The first order conditions (2) and (3) define the reaction functions for hospital i ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
and efficiency as functions of the choice of quality by hospital j: 
 
   ( ; )Ri i j iq q q T         (4) 
   ( ; )Ri i j ie e q T .       (5) 
 
Since neither of the first order conditions depends on the efficiency of hospital j, it is apparent that 
quality and efficiency of hospital i are strategically independent of the efficiency of hospital j. 
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Totally differentiating the first order conditions we obtain: 
 
      (6) 
 
where 
2 0
i i i i i iiq q ie e iq e
U U U'   !  by the concavity of the objective function.  The square bracketed 
term in (6) ŝƐƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƉƌŽĨŝƚĨƌŽŵŚŝŐŚĞƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?  It is 
ŶŽƚŽďǀŝŽƵƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƌŝǀĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇƌĞĚƵĐĞƐŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŐĂŝŶŝŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ
numbers from higher quality.  Suppose for simplicity that i jiq qD  is zero.  The second part of the 
ƐƋƵĂƌĞďƌĂĐŬĞƚĞĚƚĞƌŵŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĐŽƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƌŝǀĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
reduces demand and so the marginal cost of output of hospital i, which then responds by increasing 
quality.  However, the second term in the curly bracket shows that the lower demand also reduces 
incentives to contain costs (indirect effect) and so variable cost may increase, making increases in 
quality to attract additional patients less profitable. 
 
  
^ ` 1
1
?
[( ) ]
i j i i i j i i
i j i j i i i j i i
R
i
iq q ie e ie q iq e
j
i iq q iq iq ie e ie iq iq e
q U U U U
q
p c D c D U c D U


     
w    '  w
­ ½° °     '® ¾° °¯ ¿
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3. Methods 
tĞƚĞƐƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌrivals 
using the following function: 
 
     , ,i i i i iy f y X H        (7) 
 
where iy  is the quality or efficiency of hospital i ( 1,..., I ); iy  is the quality or efficiency of 
hospital i ?ƐƌŝǀĂůƐ ? iX  is a vector of covariates including demand shifters (e.g. population density, 
proportion of elderly individuals), supply shifters (e.g. number of managers, proportion of 
consultants), and hospital type (e.g. foundation trusts, teaching hospitals); and iH  is the error term. 
From (7), we specify a cross-sectional spatial lag model: 
 
    i ij j i ijy w y XU E Hc  ¦      (8) 
 
where jy  is the quality or efficiency of hospital i ?Ɛrival j ( 1,..., I i z ), ijw  is a weight related to the 
spatial relationship between hospital i and j, and iX  includes the intercept. In matrix form: 
 
    Y WY XU E H         (9) 
 
where W is the spatial weight matrix composed of the elements ijw . The spatial weights are 
generated from the inverse distance function: 
 
   
1
   0      if     
      if   30 km  and  
   0      if   30 km  and  
ij ij ij
ij
i j
w d d i j
d i j

­  ° d z®° ! z¯
     (10) 
 
where ijd  is the straight line distance between hospital i and j. We assume, as in recent literature, 
that 30 km is the radius within which hospitals compete (Gaynor et al., 2012, Bloom et al., 2015). 
Hospitals that are further within a 30 km radius are given a lower weight, and hospitals that are 
further than 30 km are given a weight of zero.  The weight matrix W is row standardised, i.e. the 
elements of each row sum to one.  WY  is therefore a weighteĚĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌ
efficiency. 
 
The key coefficient is U .  If 0U !  quality (efficiency) increases in response ƚŽĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƌŝǀĂůƐ ?
quality (efficiency).  Spatial correlation can be due to strategic interactions between providers but 
also to two additional categories of factors.  First, unobserved characteristics common across rival 
hospitals may affect quality in a given area.  For instance, rival hospitals with appealing 
neighbourhoods are more likely to attract and employ skilled doctors and managers, and provide 
similar quality.  ^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŵĂǇǀĂƌǇǁŝƚŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŽƌ
unobserved, of rival hospitals.  For instance, a ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŵĂǇincrease if there is a high 
proportion of foundation trusts amongst its rivals which enhances competition.  If we fail to account 
for these factors, spatial correlation will be spurious.  There is an analogy between our spatial 
approach and the peer-effects literature, which refers to the two possible sources of bias as 
respectively  “correlated effects ?ĂŶĚ “contextual effects ? ?and the general identification issue as the 
 “reflection problem ?(Manski, 1993). 
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To control for time-invariant unobserved factors, we estimate a spatial panel model:  
 
   it ij jt it i t itjy w y XU E D J Hc    ¦      (11) 
 
where 1,...,t T , iD  captures unobserved time-invariant hospital heterogeneity, and tJ  is a time 
fixed effect. 
 
We conduct three separate sensitivity checks on regressions (8) and (11).  First, we test whether 
disturbances are spatially correlated using a spatial autocorrelation (SAC) regression, which models 
spatial correlation in the error term (      iji t j t i tj wH O H [ ¦ ). Second, following the theory in 
section 2 ?ǁĞƚĞƐƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ )ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ )ďǇ
adding a spatially lagged efficiency (quality) measure to the main regressions.  Finally, we 
re-estimate our primary regressions extending the radius within which hospitals compete to 60 km 
or 90 km.  
 
We estimate spatial cross-sectional models by ML and spatial panel models by fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) ML.1  The ML estimator is biased in the presence of unobserved correlated and 
contextual effects.  Although controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity iD  may 
alleviate the problem, the key coefficient ÖU  may still not be identified if there are unobserved 
time-varying factors affecting the patient case-mix. 
 
As a further sensitivity check, we estimate (8) through two spatial IV approaches.  The first IV 
approach is a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator that instruments WY  with its 3-year lagged 
value ( 3tWY ).   
 
The second IV approach consists of a 2SLS estimator that uses a spatially lagged covariate WZ  to 
instrument WY , where Z  is a single covariate in the matrix of covariates X . This approach is 
inspired by the generalised spatial two-stage least squares estimator (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 
1999). 
  
                                                 
1 We use the Stata user-written command spreg to estimate cross-sectional models (Drukker et al., 2015), and xsmle to 
estimate panel models (Belotti et al., 2014). 
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4. Data 
We have eight quality indicators and six efficiency indicators measured at hospital trust level.2 All 
measures are from 2010-11 to 2013-14, except for the readmission rate which is from 2008-09 and 
2011-12. 
 
4.1 Quality indicators 
The risk-adjusted Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is the ratio of the actual 
number of deaths from all causes in hospital or within 30 days of discharge to the number of deaths 
expected given the characteristics of patients.  We also use risk-adjusted mortality rates for two 
emergency conditions (hip fracture and stroke), and risk-adjusted emergency readmissions for all 
conditions. 
 
We collect risk-adjusted average health change for patients who had a hip replacement from PROMs 
(patient reported outcome measures) data.  On the basis of the EQ-5D questionnaire (Brooks, 1996, 
Brooks et al., 2005), tŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚŝƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-
assessed health status of elective patients before and six months after their surgery.  Clinical quality 
indicators and PROMs are available from the health and social care information centre (HSCIC).3 
 
We use three patient satisfaction indicators for overall experience, hospital cleanliness, and 
involvement in treatment decisions.  Patients were asked to rate their hospital experience on a scale 
between 0 and 100, whereas 0 indicates extreme dissatisfaction and 100 complete satisfaction.  The 
indicators are obtained by averaging the patient rates across hospitals and they are risk-adjusted 
ƵƐŝŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?gender, age, ethnic group, and admission method (elective or emergency).  They are 
available from the annual NHS Inpatient Surveys conducted for the Care Quality Commission. 
 
4.2 Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of occupied to available hospital beds (e.g. Zuckerman et al., 
1994).  We measure the rate of cancelled elective operations dividing the number of cancelled 
elective operations for non-clinical reasons by the number of elective admissions (Rumbold et al., 
2015). 
 
The reference cost index (RCI) compares ĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?Ɛtotal costs with the national average total costs 
for the same HRG groups.  A RCI greater than 100 indicates higher than average costs.  We also use 
the RCI for elective and non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. 
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
Our key regressor is the spatial lag of the dependent variable WY.  Our control variables include 
demand and supply shifters.  Demand shifters comprise: demographic variables such as population 
density and proportion of elderly individuals (65 and over), which we calculate using annual mid-year 
population estimates; economic deprivation measures such as proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, and proportion of households with property 
house; and a measure of population health such as the proportion of individuals in good or very good 
health.  Population deprivation and health measures are computed using 2011 Census data for all 
LSOAs within a 15 km radius.4 
                                                 
2 Detailed definitions of the quality and efficiency indicators are included in the appendix (Table A1 and Table A2). 
3 The SHMI is adjusted for gender, age, admission method, year index, Charlson comorbidity index, and diagnosis. Hip 
fracture and stroke mortality are adjusted for gender and age. The emergency readmission rate is adjusted for gender, age, 
admission method, diagnosis, and procedure. The health change after hip replacement is adjusted for patient 
characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health status, economic deprivation, 
comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
4 LSOAs (Lower Layer Super Output Areas) have on average 1,500 inhabitants and a minimum of 1,000. 
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Supply shifters include: the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, the 
proportion of consultants, and the number of beds.5 Information on hospital staff is collected from 
the HSCIC, whilst NHS statistics provide the number of beds.6 Finally, we control for type of hospital: 
foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. 
 
4.4 Instruments 
The instrument for our first IV approach is 3tWY .  It is assumed to be exogenous because: rival 
ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ )ǁŝƚŚĂůĂŐŽĨƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂŶĞŽƵƐƵŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇĂĨĨĞĐƚĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƵŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ
comorbidities).  It is relevant because persistence in hospital quality (efficiency) allows for 
ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƐƚĂŶĚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƌŝǀĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ) ? 
 
Valid instruments for the second IV approach are: the (spatially) lagged proportion of consultants for 
lagged SHMI; the lagged proportion of junior doctors in training for lagged emergency readmission 
rate, all lagged patient satisfaction indicators, lagged RCI, and lagged elective and non-elective RCI; 
and the lagged number of managers for lagged bed occupancy rate and lagged rate of cancelled 
elective operations.  ZŝǀĂůƐ ?supply shifters are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term.  For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƵŶŽďƐĞƌved 
patient case-ŵŝǆ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?7  In principle, we 
can expect lagged supply shifters to be also relevant (i.e. correlated with lagged quality) if supply 
shifters affect hospital quality.  For examplĞ ?ŝĨĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇǁĞĐĂŶĞǆƉĞĐƚsome correlation between ƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐĂŶĚƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? 
 
4.5 Sample 
Table I provides descriptive statistics. The number of hospital trusts varies between 106 (for hip 
fracture mortality rate) and 142 (for emergency readmission rate) across indicators.  The sample size 
for each indicator is determined by the number of hospitals with at least one rival, and is constant 
over time because we use a balanced panel.  Hospitals with no providers within a radius of 30 km 
(i.e. monopolists) are excluded from the sample because, by construction, they do not compete. 
Considering the overall patient satisfaction ?ƐƐĂŵƉůĞ 13% of hospitals are monopolists. 23% are 
exposed to low competition with one or two rivals. 38% are located in areas with three to nine rivals, 
and 26% have more than nine rivals (up to a maximum of 25 rivals). 
 
4.6 Descriptive statistics 
The SHMI is on average 100 by construction. Mean hip fracture mortality rate is 7.2% and mean 
stroke mortality is 17.4%.  The mean emergency readmission rate is 11.1%.  On average, patients 
undergoing hip replacement have an average health gain of 0.413 QALYs.  Patients express on 
average high overall satisfaction with a rating of 78.8. They are highly satisfied also with hospital 
cleanliness and involvement in treatment decisions with a rating of 88.1 and 72, respectively.  The 
bed occupancy rate is 87% and the cancelled elective operations rate is 0.81%.  The RCIs are 
standardised to 100 by definition. 
  
                                                 
5 The proportion of junior doctors in training and consultants are computed as percentage of the clinical staff including 
doctors, nurses, and professional healthcare allied (e.g. therapists, healthcare scientists, technicians). 
6 Data on hospital staff are available from 2010-11 onwards. The number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in 
training, and the proportion of consultants are therefore omitted in the regressions for the emergency readmission rate 
estimated by ML to allow comparability between cross-sectional and panel models. The same staff variables are instead 
included in the regressions for the emergency readmission rate estimated by IV to extend the set of possible instruments. 
7 We exclude lagged demand shifters because they are constructed on catchment populations that are overlapping across 
rival hospitals. 
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Table I  W Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Trusts Monop Mean Std. dev. 
Ov        Betw       With 
Min Max 
Quality indicator                   
     Clinical                   
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 476 119 20 99.9 10.0 9.5 3.5 53.9 124.8 
Hip fracture mortality rate (%) 424 106 19 7.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.4 14.6 
Stroke mortality rate (%) 444 111 20 17.4 3.2 2.4 2.2 9.8 32.7 
Emergency readmission rate (%) 568 142 20 11.1 1.4 1.3 0.6 5.1 17.2 
     Patient reported          
Average health change after hip replacement 428 107 19 0.413 0.033 0.022 0.025 0.264 0.538 
Overall patient satisfaction 528 132 19 78.8 3.9 3.5 1.8 67.3 90.4 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 528 132 19 88.1 3.3 3.0 1.3 77.3 96.8 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 528 132 19 72.0 3.9 3.4 2.0 61.8 85.4 
Efficiency indicator          
Bed occupancy rate (%) 536 134 18 87.0 6.5 5.7 3.0 58.3 98.7 
Rate of cancelled elective operation (%) 536 134 17 0.81 0.37 0.31 0.19 0.02 2.41 
Reference cost index 560 140 18 100.6 10.8 10.2 3.5 81.1 148.2 
Elective reference cost index 560 140 18 100.8 15.5 13.6 7.4 62.7 167.7 
Non-elective reference cost index 560 140 18 102.4 17.9 16.0 8.1 70.4 213.1 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 508 127 18 99.6 24.6 20.4 13.9 37.8 237.1 
Control variable          
     Demand shifter          
Population density (1,000 indv/km2)    1.808 2.032 2.037 0.041 0.124 7.859 
Proportion of elderly individuals (%)    15.7 3.1 3.1 0.6 9.2 25.2 
Proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job (%)    70.0 2.9 2.9 0.0 63.9 76.7 
Proportion of individuals with a degree (%)    18.4 7.9 7.9 0.0 7.4 35.9 
Proportion of households with property house (%)    61.6 8.9 9.0 0.0 40.0 77.6 
Proportion of individuals in good or very good health (%)    81.5 2.9 2.9 0.0 75.2 86.8 
     Supply shifter          
Number of managers (100)    0.66 0.44 0.43 0.11 0.04 3.59 
Proportion of junior doctors in training (%)    2.6 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.0 6.7 
Proportion of consultants (%)    6.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 2.2 11.7 
Number of beds (1,000)    0.631 0.342 0.340 0.042 0.014 2.025 
     Hospital type          
Foundation trust    0.629 0.484 0.477 0.087 0 1 
Teaching hospital    0.184 0.388 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Specialist hospital    0.106 0.308 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Obs=total number of observations, Trusts=number of non-monopolist hospital trusts, Monop=number of monopolists, Ov=overall, Betw=between, 
With=within 
Descriptive statistics refer to the sample of providers with at least one rival. 
Descriptive statistics on control variables are calculated on the overall patient satisfaction's sample. 
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Descriptive statistics of the regressors are for ƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐĂŵƉůĞ ?On average, 
the population density in the catchment area is 1,808 inhabitants per km2, and 15.7% of individuals 
is older than 65 years. 70% of individuals are employed or looking for a job, 18.4% have a degree, 
61.6% of households own a property house, and 81.5% of individuals are in good or very good 
health.  Hospitals have on average 66 managers.  Junior doctors in training and consultants 
represent respectively 2.6% and 6.3% of clinical staff.  Hospitals have on average 631 beds.  83 
hospitals (62.9%) are foundation trusts, 24 (18.4%) are teaching, and 14 (10.6%) are specialist. 
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5. Results 
Table II shows the results of the global DŽƌĂŶ ?s I test for quality and efficiency indicators.8  Spatial 
correlation is significant (at 5% level) and positive for two clinical (SHMI and emergency 
readmissions) and two patient-reported (patient satisfaction on overall experience and hospital 
cleanliness) indicators.  Its magnitude varies between moderate (0.150 for overall patient 
satisfaction in 2012-13) and high (0.528 for SHMI in 2012-13).  All four cost indicators have a 
significant and positive spatial correlation ranging from 0.150 (for RCI for hip replacement in 
2011-12) and 0.483 (for RCI in 2013-14).9 
 
5.1 ML results 
Table III reports the estimated spatial lag coefficient ( ÖU ) for each quality and efficiency indicator 
using the ML estimator and after controlling for demand shifters, supply shifters, and type of 
hospital.  In the cross-sectional model, SHMI is the only indicator with a positive and statistically 
significant estimated spatial lag. 10% lower SHMI (higher quality) in rival hospitals increases on 
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƚŚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐSHMI by 2.9% in 2010-11 and 2% in 2011-12.  For other quality and efficiency 
indicators, we obtain a statistically insignificant or weakly significant (at 10% level) estimated spatial 
lag with a few exceptions (stroke mortality rate in 2013-14 and non-elective RCI in 2010-11).10 
Overall, there is weak statistical evidence of spatial correlation in cross-sectional models. 
 
Unlike supply shifters and hospital type dummies, demand shifters play a major role in generating 
cross-sectional spatial correlation.  Rival hospitals are indeed close neighbours sharing similar 
population characteristics.  Table A6 (Table A7) in the appendix provides the estimated coefficient 
for demand shifters, supply shifters, and hospital type in the regressions for the quality (efficiency) 
indicators.  For instance, one more percentage point of elderly individuals increases on average the 
overall patient satisfaction rating by 0.3 points.  An additional manager decreases on average stroke 
mortality by 1.6 percentage points.  Foundation trusts are associated with higher patient 
satisfaction.  While teaching hospitals do not show statistically different quality or efficiency, 
specialist hospitals have better quality (e.g. lower readmission rates) but lower efficiency (e.g. 
greater RCIs). 
 
Table III also has estimates of the spatial lag coefficient after controlling for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity using FE and RE ML.  We observe a positive and statistically significant 
spatial lag for SHMI (0.172) and overall patient satisfaction (0.110).11  In sum, cross-sectional and 
panel ML estimates show little statistical evidence in favour of spatial dependence in quality and 
efficiency.  This suggests that hospitals may not respond to rivals in their quality and efficiency 
decisions. 
  
                                                 
8 dŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů DŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ / ƚĞƐƚ ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ƐƉĂƚŝĂů ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ (Anselin, 2013). It 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŽĐĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŵĞasure of spatial clustering for each observation (Anselin, 1995). 
9 Table A3 and Table A4 ŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉĞŶĚŝǆĚŝƐƉůĂǇƚŚĞůŽĐĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚŽŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?-11 for 
hospitals which local spatial correlation is statistically significant at 5%. In general, there is some evidence of hospital 
clustering in the London area. Other hospitals not located in London, however, also exhibit a positive and significant local 
spatial correlation. The majority of hospitals show an insignificant local spatial correlation. 
10 As a sensitivity check, we risk-adjust the bed occupancy rate and the RCI, which refer to overall hospital activity, by also 
controlling for proportion of male patients, patient age, and proportion of emergency admissions in equation (8) and (11). 
As shown in Table A5 in the appendix, results are similar to those reported in Table III. 
11 As showed in Table A8 in the appendix, results for cross-ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƉĂŶĞůŵŽĚĞůƐĂůƐŽŵŝƌƌŽƌƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚ
on the residuals. Residuals are obtained from a linear regression, estimated by OLS, including all controls except the spatial 
lag of the dependent variable. 
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Table II  W 'ůŽďĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůĐŽƌƌĞlation within a radius of 30 km 
Indicator 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 All years 
Quality           
     Clinical           
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 0.516 
(0.000)*** 
0.460  
(0.000)*** 
0.528 
(0.000)*** 
0.507 
(0.000)*** 
0.487 
(0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 0.160 
(0.040)** 
0.134 
(0.081)* 
-0.013 
(0.968) 
0.090 
(0.230) 
0.081 
(0.000)*** 
Stroke mortality rate -0.155 
 (0.067)* 
0.126 
(0.079)* 
-0.073  
(0.421) 
-0.078  
(0.387) 
-0.040  
(0.060)* 
Emergency readmission rate 0.163 
(0.009)*** 
0.235 
(0.000)*** 
 
 
 
 
0.165 
(0.000)*** 
     Patient reported      
Average health change after hip replacement 0.053 
(0.438) 
0.089 
(0.228) 
0.037 
(0.568) 
-0.030 
(0.806) 
0.041 
(0.035)** 
Overall patient satisfaction 0.210 
(0.002)*** 
0.202 
(0.003)*** 
0.150 
(0.026)** 
0.116 
(0.080)* 
0.158 
(0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 0.154 
(0.022)** 
0.128 
(0.056)* 
0.160 
(0.018)** 
0.208 
(0.002)*** 
0.164 
(0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 0.093 
(0.156) 
0.105 
(0.113) 
0.031 
(0.587) 
0.116 
(0.080)* 
0.083 
(0.000)*** 
Efficiency      
Bed occupancy rate 0.069 
(0.277) 
0.040 
(0.502) 
-0.098 
(0.195) 
0.009 
(0.813) 
0.004 
(0.720) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 0.155 
(0.019)** 
-0.050 
(0.546) 
0.088 
(0.172) 
0.046 
(0.444) 
0.053 
(0.002)*** 
Reference cost index 0.440 
(0.000)*** 
0.425 
(0.000)*** 
0.426 
(0.000)*** 
0.483 
(0.000)*** 
0.439 
(0.000)*** 
Elective reference cost index 0.226 
(0.001)*** 
0.230 
(0.000)*** 
0.293 
(0.000)*** 
0.337 
(0.000)*** 
0.272 
(0.000)*** 
Non-elective reference cost index 0.272 
(0.000)*** 
0.341 
(0.000)*** 
0.273 
(0.000)*** 
0.209 
(0.001)*** 
0.281 
(0.000)*** 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 0.189 
(0.006)*** 
0.150 
(0.025)** 
0.196 
(0.005)*** 
0.260 
(0.000)*** 
0.201 
(0.000)*** 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. The statistic in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 is therefore 
omitted. The statistic for all years is obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. 
p-values (in parentheses) are calculated assuming a normal distribution of the indicator 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table III  W ^ƉĂƚŝĂůůĂŐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐD>ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ 
Indicator Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 0.285 
(0.002)*** 
0.203 
(0.044)** 
0.108 
(0.278) 
0.145 
(0.194) 
0.172 
(0.001)*** 
0.184 
(0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate -0.025 
(0.831) 
0.119 
(0.297) 
-0.179 
(0.116) 
-0.156 
(0.184) 
-0.007 
(0.896) 
0.002C 
(0.976) 
Stroke mortality rate -0.172 
(0.117) 
-0.171 
(0.136) 
-0.174 
(0.130) 
-0.272 
(0.025)** 
-0.056 
(0.307) 
-0.059 
(0.299) 
Emergency readmission rate 0.070 
(0.483) 
0.137 
(0.140) 
 
 
 
 
0.100 
(0.055)* 
0.130 
(0.010)** 
     Patient reported       
Average health change after hip replacement 0.048 
(0.685) 
-0.029 
(0.810) 
-0.199 
(0.097)* 
-0.163 
(0.124) 
-0.044 
(0.456) 
-0.024C 
(0.682) 
Overall patient satisfaction 0.100 
(0.178) 
0.095 
(0.190) 
0.048 
(0.534) 
0.105 
(0.185) 
0.110 
(0.034)** 
0.122 
(0.005)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness -0.012 
(0.898) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
-0.061 
(0.497) 
0.086 
(0.313) 
-0.063 
(0.261) 
-0.023 
(0.647) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 0.024 
(0.778) 
0.048 
(0.561) 
-0.073 
(0.398) 
0.055 
(0.543) 
-0.023 
(0.668) 
0.016 
(0.740) 
Efficiency       
Bed occupancy rate -0.008 
(0.932) 
-0.015 
(0.887) 
-0.173 
(0.073)* 
-0.079 
(0.442) 
-0.031 
(0.559) 
-0.023C 
(0.655) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 0.068 
(0.476) 
-0.157 
(0.151) 
0.032 
(0.749) 
-0.008 
(0.934) 
0.053 
(0.289) 
0.044C 
(0.380) 
Reference cost index -0.087 
(0.378) 
-0.079 
(0.412) 
-0.067 
(0.513) 
0.003 
(0.980) 
0.007 
(0.900) 
0.018 
(0.732) 
Elective reference cost index -0.003 
(0.973) 
-0.094 
(0.323) 
-0.051 
(0.612) 
-0.030 
(0.776) 
-0.039 
(0.447) 
-0.039C 
(0.437) 
Non-elective reference cost index -0.211 
(0.037)** 
-0.108 
(0.248) 
-0.168 
(0.092)* 
-0.121 
(0.287) 
-0.072 
(0.185) 
-0.060 
(0.251) 
Reference cost index for hip replacement -0.054 
(0.626) 
-0.117 
(0.332) 
0.067 
(0.532) 
0.085 
(0.448) 
-0.041 
(0.474) 
-0.021 
(0.707) 
Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals in good or 
very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, 
teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals 
in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 are 
therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. In addition, data on hospital staff are available from 
2010-11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior 
doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
As a robustness check, we estimate the spatial lag WY  through the SAC model, which allows for 
spatial correlation in the error term.  Also in this case, cross-sectional and panel estimates show 
weak statistical significance for the spatial lag of quality and efficiency indicators (Table IV).12  We 
also ƚĞƐƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ )ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚs ƚŽƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ).13 Results in 
Table V are similar to those in Table III.14  Finally, Table A12 and Table A13 in the appendix suggest 
that our key results are robust to competition areas with a larger radius (60 km or 90 km).15 
 
5.3 IV results 
Table VI shows IV estimates of the spatial lag coefficient ÖU  for some quality and efficiency 
indicators.16  In the first IV approach, 3tWY  is valid for six quality indicators (except for stroke 
mortality and average health change after hip replacement) and for all efficiency indicators.  The 
estimates consistently show no spatial correlation in quality and efficiency in 2013-14.  In the second 
IV approach, a lagged supply shifter is a valid instrument for five quality indicators (except for the 
condition-specific outcomes) and five efficiency indicators (except for the RCI for hip replacement).17 
For both quality and efficiency indicators, the spatial lag estimates do not exhibit any statistical 
significance at 5% level (except for SHMI in 2010-11).  On the whole, similarly to ML estimates, IV 
estimates suggest the absence of spatial correlation in quality and efficiency. 
 
The results in our study are compatible with those reported in Gravelle et al. (2014b), who analyse 
sixteen quality indicators for English hospitals in 2009-10.  The two studies have five indicators in 
common: three mortality indicators such as overall mortality, hip fracture and stroke mortality, and 
two patient satisfaction indicators such as satisfaction on hospital cleanliness and decision 
involvement.18 Table A17 provides a direct comparison of the results.  If we compare results from 
Gravelle et al. (2014b) in 2009-10 with ours in 2010-11 and 2011-12 (the two closest years), the 
spatial lag is significant for overall mortality and it is insignificant for hip fracture mortality for both 
studies.  Stroke mortality is weakly significant in Gravelle et al. (2014b) and insignificant in our study. 
The results for the patient satisfaction indicators differ.  They are significant or weakly significant in 
Gravelle et al. (2014b) but they are insignificant in ours.  For patient satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness, this is due to the different years used in the analyses. For patient satisfaction on decision 
involvement, differences are due to the different analysed years and additional demand shifters in 
our analysis.19 
                                                 
12 In Table A9 in the appendix, we show the results for the Likelihood Ratio test comparing spatial lag model and SAC 
model. The test suggests that SAC is the correct model only for the rate of cancelled elective operations. 
13 tĞƵƐĞƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ďĞĚŽĐĐƵƉĂŶĐǇƌĂƚĞĂŶĚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĐŽƐƚŝŶĚĞǆĂƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĂŶĚƌŝǀĂůƐ ?^,D/ĂŶĚŽǀĞƌĂůů
patient satisfaction as measƵƌĞƐŽĨƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? 
14 /ŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞĚŽŶŽƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽŶĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ 
(Table A10 ) ?hŶůŝŬĞŽƵƌƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞů ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĨŝŶĚǁĞĂŬĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ
(Table A11 ) ?&ŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŚŝŐŚĞƌƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^,D/ ?ŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚĂƚ ?A?ůĞǀĞůǁŝƚŚďĞƚƚĞƌ
efficiency, as measured by the elective RCI, in 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13. Such an association is only weakly significant 
(at 10% level) in 2013-14 and disappears in the panel model. 
15 Table A12 and Table A13 in the appendix also show that the number of monopolist hospitals drops to one or zero when 
the radius is expanded to 60 km or 90 km, respectively. 
16 Table A14 and Table A15 in the appendix include first-stage estimate on the instrument and F statistic. As a rule of 
thumb, we assess the instrument as relevant if the first-stage F statistic is greater than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
17 In Table A16, we empirically test the exclusion restriction on the chosen instrument. We reject this assumption only once 
(patient satisfaction on decision involvement in 2010-11). 
18 Gravelle et al. (2014b) explore spatial correlation for other indicators not included in this study. Amongst these, they find 
a positive and significant spatial correlation for hip replacement readmissions and patient satisfaction on trust in the 
doctors. No (or weak) spatial correlation is instead observed for mortality from high and low risk conditions, deaths after 
surgery, hip replacement and stroke readmissions, hip and knee revisions, operations within two days from hip fracture, 
and redo rates for prostate resection. 
19 The additional demand shifters are: proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or looking for a 
job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, and proportion of individuals 
in good or very good health. 
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Table IV  W ^ƉĂƚŝĂůůĂŐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐD>ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĂĨƚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚdisturbances 
Indicator Spatial lag Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE 
Quality            
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.331** 
-0.080 
0.108 
0.154 
0.240 
-0.198 
0.085 
0.105 
0.345*** 
-0.204 
Hip fracture mortality rate Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.133 
-0.215 
0.045 
0.095 
0.193 
-0.450** 
0.239 
-0.429** 
-0.298 
0.275* 
Stroke mortality rate Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.099 
-0.341 
-0.063 
-0.132 
-0.293 
0.145 
-0.243 
-0.047 
-0.009 
-0.051 
Emergency readmission rate Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.160 
-0.152 
0.360*** 
-0.348** 
 
 
 
 
0.051 
0.052 
     Patient reported       
Average health change after hip replacement Ɇ 
ʄ 
-0.104 
0.193 
-0.001 
-0.044 
-0.135 
-0.093 
-0.017 
-0.208 
0.012 
-0.063 
Overall patient satisfaction Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.224*** 
-0.342** 
0.117 
-0.082 
0.097 
-0.107 
0.033 
0.142 
0.199 
-0.100 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness Ɇ 
ʄ 
-0.016 
0.007 
0.051 
-0.093 
0.005 
-0.124 
0.140 
-0.095 
-0.027 
-0.039 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement Ɇ 
ʄ 
-0.089 
0.189 
0.025 
0.043 
0.056 
-0.202 
0.102 
-0.080 
-0.093 
0.071 
Efficiency       
Bed occupancy rate  Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.348** 
-0.417** 
0.006 
-0.030 
-0.410*** 
0.295* 
-0.076 
-0.004 
0.059 
-0.099 
Rate of cancelled elective operations Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.549*** 
-0.570*** 
-0.013 
-0.170 
0.418*** 
-0.510*** 
0.389*** 
-0.507*** 
-0.474*** 
0.491*** 
Reference cost index Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.043 
-0.219 
0.042 
-0.225 
0.012 
-0.124 
0.101 
-0.166 
0.017 
-0.012 
Elective reference cost index Ɇ 
ʄ 
-0.215 
0.261 
0.086 
-0.221 
0.083 
-0.192 
0.107 
-0.223 
-0.374*** 
0.336*** 
Non-elective reference cost index Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.002 
-0.304* 
0.093 
-0.341** 
0.055 
-0.315* 
-0.013 
-0.175 
-0.171 
0.114 
Reference cost index for hip replacement Ɇ 
ʄ 
0.122 
-0.267 
-0.032 
-0.117 
0.048 
0.038 
0.150 
-0.085 
-0.066 
-0.001 
Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or looking 
for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals in good or very good 
health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching 
hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in 
these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 are 
therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. In addition, data on hospital staff are available from 2010-11 
onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in 
training, and the proportion of consultants. 
The p-value is omitted. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table V  W ^ƉĂƚŝĂůůĂŐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐD>ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĂĨƚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐĨŽƌƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ 
Indicator Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 0.212 
(0.043)** 
0.159 
(0.130)  
0.098 
(0.328)  
0.156 
(0.164)  
0.170 
(0.001)*** 
0.181 
(0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 0.016 
(0.891)  
0.094 
(0.403)  
-0.199 
(0.085)* 
-0.205 
(0.083)* 
-0.040 
(0.468)  
-0.021C 
(0.710)  
Stroke mortality rate -0.156 
(0.156)  
-0.176 
(0.132)  
-0.189 
(0.097)* 
-0.305 
(0.013)** 
-0.060 
(0.279)  
-0.057C 
(0.316)  
Emergency readmission rate 0.091 
(0.327)  
0.092 
(0.351)  
   
  
0.065 
(0.233)  
0.114 
(0.028)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement -0.006 
(0.958)  
-0.064 
(0.606)  
-0.157 
(0.207)  
-0.195 
(0.082)* 
-0.039 
(0.505)  
-0.035C 
(0.557)  
Overall patient satisfaction 0.047 
(0.568)  
0.061 
(0.460)  
0.003 
(0.971)  
0.084 
(0.349)  
0.084 
(0.113)  
0.092 
(0.052)* 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness -0.016 
(0.873)  
-0.054 
(0.565)  
-0.082 
(0.371)  
0.044 
(0.624)  
-0.069 
(0.218)  
-0.045 
(0.382)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 0.035 
(0.719)  
0.075 
(0.405)  
-0.130 
(0.163)  
0.029 
(0.761)  
-0.032 
(0.552)  
-0.001 
(0.986)  
Efficiency       
Bed occupancy rate -0.054 
(0.619)  
-0.114 
(0.333)  
-0.097 
(0.401)  
0.049 
(0.641)  
-0.090 
(0.136)  
-0.053C 
(0.367)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 0.084 
(0.424)  
-0.024 
(0.839)  
0.125 
(0.246)  
0.040 
(0.713)  
0.018 
(0.736)  
0.050 
(0.353)  
Reference cost index 0.016 
(0.886)  
0.034 
(0.757)  
0.030 
(0.787)  
-0.049 
(0.682)  
0.046 
(0.430)  
0.059 
(0.297)  
Elective reference cost index 0.016 
(0.886)  
0.034 
(0.757)  
0.030 
(0.787)  
-0.049 
(0.682)  
0.046 
(0.430)  
0.059 
(0.297)  
Non-elective reference cost index -0.064 
(0.572)  
-0.081 
(0.468)  
-0.145 
(0.189)  
-0.018 
(0.884)  
-0.076 
(0.179)  
0.025 
(0.647)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement -0.122 
(0.287)  
-0.187 
(0.092)* 
-0.012 
(0.919)  
0.068 
(0.555)  
-0.107 
(0.058)* 
-0.070 
(0.212)  
Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed 
or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals 
in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of 
beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The efficiency indicators added to the regressions for the quality 
indicators are bed occupancy rate and RCI. The quality indicators added to the regressions for the efficiency indicators are SHMI and 
overall patient satisfaction. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions including SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality as dependent or independent variable, the specialist dummy is 
omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-
14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. In addition, data on hospital staff are 
available from 2010-11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, 
the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table VI  W ^ƉĂƚŝĂůůĂŐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ/sĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ 
Indicator IV 1  IV 2 
2013-14  2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 0.519 
(0.090)* 
 0.889 
(0.012)** 
0.638 
(0.061)* 
0.272 
(0.587) 
0.534 
(0.357) 
Hip fracture mortality rate -0.035 
(0.939) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergency readmission rate 0.307 
(0.087)* 
 0.350 
(0.156) 
0.524 
(0.093)* 
 
     Patient reported       
Overall patient satisfaction 0.089 
(0.467) 
 0.063 
(0.600) 
0.061 
(0.606) 
0.004 
(0.976) 
-0.079 
(0.585) 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 0.155 
(0.218) 
 -0.174 
(0.358) 
-0.092 
(0.630) 
-0.072 
(0.696) 
0.068 
(0.711) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 0.266 
(0.081)* 
 -0.354 
(0.079)* 
-0.170 
(0.362) 
-0.131 
(0.479) 
-0.075 
(0.697) 
Efficiency       
Bed occupancy rate 0.0003 
(0.999) 
 -0.169 
(0.617) 
0.016 
(0.973) 
-0.418 
(0.312) 
0.162 
(0.731) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations -0.074 
(0.792) 
 -0.495 
(0.788) 
0.349 
(0.734) 
0.311 
(0.469) 
-0.463 
(0.234) 
Reference cost index -0.110 
(0.518) 
 -0.408 
(0.311) 
-0.195 
(0.493) 
-0.230 
(0.641) 
-0.454 
(0.337) 
Elective reference cost index 0.027 
(0.920) 
 -0.982 
(0.055)* 
-0.684 
(0.074)* 
-0.686 
(0.150) 
-1.604 
(0.214) 
Non-elective reference cost index -0.339 
(0.272) 
 -0.163 
(0.635) 
0.271 
(0.294) 
0.298 
(0.528) 
-0.305 
(0.623) 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 0.625 
-(0.109) 
     
IV 1 = IV strategy using the three-year lagged spatial lag of the dependent variable as instrument (WYt-3). 
IV 2 = IV strategy using a spatially lagged supply shifter as instrument (WZ). The instruments for the IV 2 strategy are: (spatially) 
lagged proportion of consultants for the lagged SHMI mortality rate; lagged proportion of junior doctors in training for lagged 
emergency readmission rate, lagged overall patient satisfaction, lagged patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness, lagged 
patient satisfaction on decision involvement, lagged reference cost index, lagged elective and non-elective reference cost index; 
lagged number of managers for lagged bed occupancy rate and lagged rate of cancelled elective operations. 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or looking 
for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals in 
good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of 
beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. For IV 1, the estimate refers to the latest 
available year (2011-12) and not to 2013-14. For IV 2, estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 are omitted. 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, IV 1 and IV 2's estimates are omitted because of the 
absence of valid instruments. Similarly, IV 2's estimates are omitted for hip fracture mortality and RCI for hip replacement. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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6. Conclusions 
dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌ
efficiency of its rivals.  &ŝƌƐƚ ?ǁĞƚĞƐƚĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďǇŐůŽďĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚĂŶĚĨŝŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
of a positive spatial correlation amongst some quality and efficiency indicators.  Second, we estimate 
spatial cross-sectional models by ML and no longer observe a statistically significant spatial 
correlation in most indicators.  Similarly, we observe little evidence of spatial correlation after 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity through a spatial panel model estimated by 
ML.  Finally, our two spatial cross-sectional IV approaches further suggest the absence of spatial 
correlation for both quality and efficiency indicators.  Hospital quality (efficiency), therefore, does 
not appear to respond to the quality (efficiency) of neighbouring hospitals. 
 
In conclusion, our empirical analysis suggests the absence of hospital spillovers in quality and 
efficiency.  These findings have important policy implications.  They suggest that interventions 
incentivising quality or efficiency at local level may not affect other hospitals.  The results have 
implications for antitrust policies.  Our study suggests that hospital mergers that might increase 
efficiency of merging hospitals (as a result of better scale economies) at the cost of reducing their 
quality (as a result of reduced competition) will not induce non-merging hospitals also to increase 
efficiency or reduce quality. 
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Appendix 
Table A1  W definition for the quality indicators 
Quality indicators 
The Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is a ratio of the observed number of deaths to the 
expected number of deaths for a trust (provider). The observed number of deaths is the total number of 
finished provider spells for the trust which resulted in a death either in-hospital or within 30 days (inclusive) 
of discharge from the trust. The expected number of deaths is calculated from a risk-adjusted model with a 
patient case-mix of age, gender, admission method, year index, Charlson Comorbidity Index and diagnosis 
grouping. A three year dataset is used to create the risk-adjusted models. 
The hip fracture mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency 
admission to hospital with a primary diagnosis of fractured proximal femur (ICD-10 codes S720, S721, S722). 
It is indirectly standardised by age and sex. 
The stroke mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency 
admission to hospital with a primary diagnosis of stroke (all ICD-10 codes from I61 to I64). It is indirectly 
standardised by age and sex. 
The emergency readmission rate captures the percentage of emergency admission to any hospital in 
England occurring within 28 days of the last discharge from hospital after admission. The rate is calculated 
considering all patients aged between 16 and 74. It is indirectly standardised by age, sex, method of 
admission of discharge spell, diagnosis within medical specialties, and procedure within surgical specialties. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre, NHS Digital Indicator Portal 
Link: https://indicators.hscic.gov.uk/webview/ 
The average health change after hip replacement is extracted from PROMs data. PROMs comprise a pair of 
questionnaires completed by the patient, one before and one after surgery (at least six months after for hip 
replacements). All patients, irrespective of their condition, are asked to complete a common set of 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌŚĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?dŚŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƉƌĞ-existing 
conditions and the EQ-5D health questionnaire consisting of a five-dimensional descriptive system and a 
visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS). Post-operative questionnaires also contain additional questions about the 
surgery, such as how the patient perceives the results of the operation and whether there were any post-
operative complications, such as bleeding or wound problems. Patients undergoing hip replacement surgery 
are also asked to complete a condition-specific section. The collected data are risk-adjusted for patient 
characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health status, economic 
deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre 
Link: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/proms 
Patient satisfaction indicators are derived from the NHS Inpatient Surveys for the Care Quality Commission 
which is administered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts. The variables relate to three 
questions to patients: 1) From 0 to 100, "Overall, how would you rate the care you received?" (Overall 
patient satisfaction); 2) From 0 to 100, "In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that you 
were in?" (Satisfaction on hospital cleanliness ? ? ? ?&ƌŽŵ ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? “tĞƌĞǇŽƵŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐǇŽƵ
wanted to be in decisions about your care and treaƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?Satisfaction on decision involvement). The data 
has been standardised to adjust for these differences in patient-ŵŝǆƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŐĞ ?ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?
ethnic group and method of admission (emergency or elective). 
Source: NHS patient surveys 
Links: http://www.nhssurveys.org/surveys , https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/patients-
experience-using-hospital-services 
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Table A2  W Definition for the efficiency indicators 
Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of the overnight occupied beds to the overnight available beds. For 
wards open overnight, an occupied bed day is defined as one which is occupied at midnight on the day in 
question. The number of occupied beds excludes any bed days of occupation by well babies. The number of 
available beds only includes beds in units managed by the provider, not beds commissioned from other 
providers. It excludes any beds designated solely for the use of well babies. Such data are available 
quarterly. 
The rate of cancelled elective operations is the ratio of the number of last minute cancellations by the 
hospital for non-clinical reasons to the number of elective patients. Last minute means on the day the 
patient was due to arrive, after the patient has arrived in hospital, or on the day of the operation or surgery. 
Elective cancelled operations are provided in each quarter. The number of elective patients is calculated as 
the sum of planned and waiting list admissions, where the admission is a finished admission episode, i.e. the 
first period of inpatient care under one consultant within one healthcare provider. The number of elective 
patients is published annually. 
Source: NHS statistics 
Link: https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ 
The reference cost index ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽƐƚŽĨĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ-mix compared with the same case-
ŵŝǆĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĐŽƐƚ ?ĂĐŚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĐŽƐƚŝŶĚĞǆŝƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐŝƚƐ
total costs (unit costs × activity) by the expected costs (national average mean unit cost × activity). The 
reference cost index is computed separately also for elective and non-elective activity. Elective activity 
refers to patients whose admission to hospital is planned, including day case patients. Non-elective activity 
refers to patients whose admission is not planned, including emergency admissions and admissions for 
maternity, births, and non-emergency patient transfers, and requires staying in hospital for more than one 
day. The reference cost index for hip replacement is calculated selecting the HRG codes: HB11A, HB11B, 
HB11C, HB12A, HB12B, and HB12C. 
Source: Reference costs data 
Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs 
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Table A3  W >ŽĐĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƌĂĚŝƵƐŽĨ ? ?km for seven quality indicators 
SHMI  Hip fracture 
mortality 
 Stroke mortality  Emergency 
readmissions 
 Health change after 
hip repl. 
 Overall patient 
satisfaction 
 Satisfaction on 
hospital cleanliness 
Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc 
-0.576 Yes HL  0.632 No HH  -2.386 No HL  -1.280 No LH  -1.570 No HL  -4.573 Yes HL  -2.402 No HL 
0.626 Yes LL  1.041 No LL  -1.301 Yes HL  -1.132 No LH  -1.384 Yes LH  -0.656 Yes LH  -0.763 No HL 
0.665 Yes LL  1.134 No HH  -1.006 No LH  -0.634 Yes HL  -0.868 No HL  -0.648 No LH  -0.754 No LH 
0.879 Yes LL  1.452 No HH  0.587 No HH  -0.457 Yes LH  0.982 No LL  -0.428 Yes HL  0.414 Yes LL 
0.903 No HH  1.506 No LL  0.634 Yes LL  0.460 No HH  2.481 No LL  0.410 No LL  0.422 Yes LL 
1.057 Yes LL  1.864 No HH  0.670 Yes LL  1.055 No HH      0.465 No LL  0.491 Yes LL 
1.084 No LL  2.299 No LL  0.775 Yes LL  1.204 No HH      0.619 Yes LL  0.508 Yes LL 
1.108 No HH  2.485 No LL  1.020 Yes LL  1.424 No HH      0.818 No HH  0.535 No LL 
1.132 Yes LL      1.159 No HH  1.501 Yes LL      0.940 No LL  0.617 Yes LL 
1.142 No HH      1.210 No HH  1.650 No HH      1.005 No HH  0.718 Yes LL 
1.289 Yes LL      1.319 Yes LL  1.706 No HH      1.009 No LL  0.753 Yes LL 
1.332 Yes LL      1.514 No HH  1.737 Yes LL      2.002 No HH  0.864 No LL 
1.452 Yes LL      1.563 Yes LL  1.851 No HH      2.216 No HH  0.907 No LL 
1.596 Yes LL      1.620 Yes LL  2.157 No HH      2.592 No HH  0.924 Yes LL 
1.692 Yes LL      2.045 Yes LL  3.764 No LL      2.922 Yes HH  0.978 Yes LL 
1.840 Yes LL      2.163 Yes LL  3.764 No LL      2.923 Yes HH  1.224 No LL 
2.008 No HH      2.376 Yes LL              1.716 Yes LL 
2.008 No HH                      1.729 No HH 
2.044 No LL                      1.805 Yes LL 
2.060 Yes LL                      1.810 No HH 
2.645 Yes LL                      2.077 No HH 
3.135 Yes LL                      2.151 No HH 
3.881 Yes LL                         
4.007 Yes LL                         
4.291 Yes LL                         
4.821 Yes LL                         
No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts 
119  106  111  142  107  132  132 
Lon=London, Sc=Spatial cluster, LL=low-low, HH=high-high, LH=low-high, HL=high-low 
Each statistic represents the local spatial correlation of a single hospital. We only show statistics that are significant at 5% level. 
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Table A4  W >ŽĐĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƌĂĚŝƵƐŽĨ ? ?ŬŵĨŽƌĂƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽr and six efficiency indicators 
Satisfaction on decision 
involvement 
 Bed occupancy rate  Cancelled elective 
procedures 
 RCI  Elective RCI  Non-elective RCI  RCI for hip 
replacement 
Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc  Statistic Lon Sc 
-3.661 No HL  -4.220 No LH  -2.430 No LH  -2.300 No HL  -2.256 No HL  -2.648 No HL  -1.942 No LH 
-1.894 No LH  -4.220 No HL  -1.587 No HL  -2.285 No LH  -1.960 No LH  -2.648 No LH  -1.782 Yes LH 
-0.810 No LH  -1.423 No LH  -0.540 Yes HL  0.559 Yes HH  -1.856 No HL  -2.308 Yes LH  -1.754 No LH 
0.505 Yes LL  -0.959 Yes LH  0.465 Yes LL  0.583 Yes HH  -1.781 No LH  -1.723 No LH  -1.346 No LH 
0.509 Yes LL  -0.907 No LH  0.854 No LL  0.640 Yes HH  -0.913 No LH  -1.573 No HL  -0.801 Yes LH 
0.526 Yes LL  0.435 Yes HH  0.955 No LL  0.684 Yes HH  -0.805 Yes LH  -0.783 No HL  -0.572 Yes LH 
0.564 Yes LL  0.487 Yes HH  1.056 No LL  0.751 Yes HH  -0.727 Yes LH  -0.672 No LH  0.501 Yes HH 
0.655 Yes LL  0.541 Yes HH  1.294 No HH  0.822 Yes HH  -0.543 Yes LH  0.864 Yes HH  0.821 No HH 
0.672 Yes LL  0.620 Yes HH  3.192 No HH  1.011 Yes HH  0.608 Yes HH  1.174 Yes HH  0.871 Yes HH 
0.733 Yes LL  0.888 No LL      1.194 Yes HH  0.659 No HH  1.176 No LL  0.908 No HH 
1.256 No HH  1.057 No LL      1.242 Yes HH  0.694 Yes HH  1.702 Yes HH  1.079 Yes HH 
1.688 Yes HH  1.288 No HH      1.327 Yes HH  0.974 Yes HH  2.343 Yes HH  1.161 Yes HH 
1.733 No HH  2.449 No HH      1.515 Yes HH  1.002 Yes HH  2.514 Yes HH  1.245 Yes HH 
1.972 Yes HH  2.451 No LL      2.583 Yes HH  1.178 Yes HH  2.523 Yes HH  1.366 No LL 
2.119 No HH          2.855 Yes HH  1.376 Yes HH  2.597 Yes HH  1.426 No LL 
2.119 No HH          3.124 Yes HH  1.421 Yes HH  2.903 Yes HH  1.428 Yes HH 
            3.575 Yes HH  1.661 Yes HH  3.030 Yes HH  1.705 Yes HH 
            3.778 Yes HH  1.846 Yes HH  4.194 Yes HH  1.807 Yes HH 
            4.190 Yes HH  1.860 Yes HH  4.910 Yes HH  1.955 Yes HH 
            4.247 Yes HH  1.913 Yes HH  6.292 Yes HH  1.973 Yes HH 
            4.554 Yes HH  1.956 No LL  6.549 Yes HH  2.837 Yes HH 
            6.084 Yes HH  1.956 No LL      2.906 Yes HH 
            7.021 Yes HH  2.032 Yes HH      2.978 Yes HH 
                2.768 Yes HH         
                4.490 Yes HH         
                5.464 Yes HH         
No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts  No. of trusts 
132  134  134  140  140  140  127 
Lon=London, Sc=Spatial cluster, LL=low-low, HH=high-high, LH=low-high, HL=high-low 
Each statistic represents the local spatial correlation of a single hospital. We only show statistics that are significant at 5% level. 
 
ŽŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?A spatial econometrics approach  27 
 
 
Table A5  W ML estimates for bed occupancy rate and RCI including controls for risk-adjustment 
Regressors Bed occupancy rate  Reference cost index 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE  2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE 
  Spatial lag of the dependent variable 0.002 0.018 -0.115 -0.011 -0.025  -0.053 -0.044 -0.042 0.023 0.003 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 s
h
if
te
r 
Population density 0.648 -0.508 -0.339 1.176* -6.994  1.924** 1.623* 1.604* 1.797** -5.848 
Prop. of elderly individuals -0.396 -0.898** -0.624* -0.246 0.702  -0.062 -0.739 -1.210*** -0.783* 1.510* 
Prop. of ind. empl. or looking for a job -0.483 -0.365 -0.415 -0.147   0.582 0.408 0.519 0.973*  
Prop. of individuals with a degree -0.138 0.113 0.079 -0.373**   0.303 0.151 0.336 0.481**  
Prop. of households with property house 0.111 0.189 0.213 0.148   0.100 0.196 0.357 0.482**  
Prop. of ind. in good/very good health 0.887 0.272 0.277 0.925   -0.168 0.178 -0.876 -1.135  
C
o
st
 s
h
if
te
r Number of managers -0.717 -0.701 -1.666 0.191 1.953*  1.996 1.946 3.339* 1.526 -1.506 
Prop. of junior doctors in training -0.430 -0.725 -0.504 -0.476 1.934***  0.526 0.224 -0.354 -0.299 -1.727** 
Prop. of consultants -1.871*** -0.719 -0.226 -0.657 -1.019**  -1.962*** -0.848 -0.202 0.324 -0.051 
Number of beds -3.092 -3.359 -1.203 -1.021 -15.677***  0.812 0.825 -3.963 -0.628 4.414 
T
y
p
e
 
Foundation trust -2.314** -2.687** -2.381** -2.351** -1.355  -1.970 -2.748** -2.088 -2.229* -4.866*** 
Teaching hospital 0.503 -1.126 -4.018** -0.460 0.994  -0.203 -1.105 -2.153 -1.991 -2.373 
Specialist hospital -1.435 -3.114 -11.796*** -4.559   6.230 5.038 -2.938 -0.701  
R
is
k
-a
d
ju
st
m
e
n
t Prop. of male patients 0.810*** 0.703*** 0.841*** 0.630*** 0.508**  1.067*** 0.689*** 0.334* 0.287 0.554** 
Prop. of patients between 15 and 59 0.282*** 0.317*** 0.225*** 0.109 0.178  0.341*** 0.181 0.134 0.140 -0.085 
Prop. of patients between 60 and 74 -0.539*** -0.439*** -0.361*** -0.352*** -0.248  -0.377** -0.181 0.131 0.131 -0.101 
Prop. of patients beyond 74 0.531*** 0.522*** 0.234 0.358** 0.610**  -0.096 -0.374* -0.148 -0.320 -0.032 
Prop. of emergency patients 0.000 0.034 -0.044 -0.001 -0.158**  -0.340*** -0.229** -0.327*** -0.207* -0.042 
  Constant 17.109 52.175 65.769** -2.138   34.205 41.282 123.793*** 86.284**  
Variance 22.91*** 26.31*** 23.49*** 22.14*** 7.99***  38.24*** 39.52*** 39.13*** 38.25*** 11.42*** 
Observations 134 134 134 134 536  140 140 140 140 560 
Year dummies are included in the panel model but not reported 
The RE estimator is not reported because always statistically inconsistent 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A6  W ML estimates for the quality indicators in 2013-14 
Regressors SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Health 
change hip 
repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanlin. 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
  
Spatial lag of the dependent variable 0.145 -0.156 -0.272** 0.137 -0.163 0.105 0.086 0.055 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 s
h
if
te
r 
Population density -0.903 0.032 0.240 -0.052 0.009** 0.156 0.246 -0.058 
Proportion of elderly individuals -0.037 -0.268** 0.089 -0.216** 0.004*** 0.330** 0.322** 0.624*** 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job 0.237 0.148 -0.109 -0.037 -0.001 0.044 0.058 0.080 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.397 0.052 0.060 0.031 -0.002* -0.069 -0.157* -0.073 
Proportion of households with property house 0.019 0.103* 0.041 0.002 0.0000 -0.086 -0.081 -0.196* 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health -0.603 -0.541*** -0.164 -0.200 0.008** 0.147 0.043 0.279 
C
o
st
 s
h
if
te
r 
Number of managers -1.797 -0.315 -1.606**  -0.004 0.435 -0.888 0.293 
Proportion of junior doctors in training 0.917 -0.016 0.637  -0.016*** -0.664** -0.587** -0.827** 
Proportion of consultants -0.605 -0.160 0.404  0.002 0.090 0.117 0.049 
Number of beds 2.667 -0.165 -0.767 0.362 0.010 0.578 1.357 1.272 
T
y
p
e
 
Foundation trust 0.432 -0.224 -0.480 -0.049 -0.002 1.44*** 0.523 1.434** 
Teaching hospital -2.005 0.698 0.149 -0.160 -0.010 0.838 1.172 0.693 
Specialist hospital    -1.257*** -0.024 5.434*** 4.620*** 5.795*** 
  
Constant 126.827*** 39.683*** 34.329* 31.199*** -0.067 56.281*** 75.031*** 43.391** 
Variance 42.184 2.058*** 8.212*** 1.422*** 0.001*** 4.094*** 5.156*** 8.019*** 
Observations 119 106 111 142 107 132 132 132 
Only cross-sectional results for 2013-14 are reported. Results for the emergency readmission rate refer to the most recent available financial year (2011-12). 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Estimates for the emergency readmission rate refer to 2011-12. Data on this variable are currently available up to 2011-12. Data on hospital staff are available from 2010-11 
onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of 
consultants. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A7  W ML estimates for the efficiency indicators in 2013-14 
Regressors Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for hip 
repl. 
  
Spatial lag of the dependent variable -0.079 -0.008 0.003 -0.030 -0.121 0.096 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 s
h
if
te
r 
Population density 1.529** 0.043 2.06** 2.813** 1.754 0.590 
Proportion of elderly individuals 0.018 -0.010 -0.942** -0.831 -0.821 -0.140 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job -0.215 0.016 1.341** 0.824 2.832** 2.623* 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.421** -0.027** 0.519** -0.234 1.045** 0.635 
Proportion of households with property house 0.143 0.007 0.526** 0.036 0.482 -0.723 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health 1.194* 0.028 -1.474* 0.141 -3.247* -2.512 
C
o
st
 s
h
if
te
r 
Number of managers 0.364 0.048 2.602 0.147 3.677 -3.900 
Proportion of junior doctors in training -0.051 -0.037 -0.398 1.164 0.205 1.974 
Proportion of consultants -0.237 0.028 0.489 0.406 0.839 -1.076 
Number of beds 1.123 0.010 -0.018 -4.200 3.977 11.189 
T
y
p
e
 
Foundation trust -2.458** -0.145** -1.342 -2.186 -1.717 4.757 
Teaching hospital -1.148 0.170 0.614 2.456 0.087 -5.376 
Specialist hospital -5.618* -0.048 9.426*** 11.789** 21.428*** 25.155 
  
Constant 11.159 -2.494 91.661** 41.426 129.643 135.915 
Variance 28.800*** 0.118*** 41.994*** 110.523*** 193.989*** 298.786*** 
Observations 134 134 140 140 140 127 
Only cross-sectional results for 2013-14 are reported 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A8  W 'ůŽďĂůDŽƌĂŶ ?Ɛ/ƚĞƐƚĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƌĂĚŝƵƐŽĨ ? ?ŬŵŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ 
Indicator 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 All years 
Quality           
     Clinical           
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 0.148 
(0.036)** 
0.117 
(0.092)* 
0.038 
(0.535) 
0.081 
(0.222) 
0.086 
(0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate -0.049 
(0.633) 
0.073 
(0.314) 
-0.152 
(0.084)* 
-0.124 
(0.166) 
-0.019 
(0.430) 
Stroke mortality rate -0.139 
(0.108) 
-0.114 
(0.183) 
-0.075 
(0.405) 
-0.109 
(0.215) 
-0.048 
(0.023)** 
Emergency readmission rate 0.025 
(0.620) 
0.047 
(0.393) 
 
 
 
 
0.040 
(0.009)*** 
     Patient reported      
Average health change after hip replacement 0.046 
(0.487) 
-0.022 
(0.879) 
-0.105 
(0.242) 
-0.122 
(0.169) 
-0.003 
(0.976) 
Overall patient satisfaction -0.029 
(0.764) 
0.007 
(0.835) 
-0.001 
(0.928) 
0.099 
(0.132) 
0.030 
(0.075)* 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness -0.004 
(0.958) 
-0.025 
(0.806) 
-0.068 
(0.393) 
0.028 
(0.611) 
0.002 
(0.824) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 0.036 
(0.543) 
0.041 
(0.491) 
-0.079 
(0.312) 
0.017 
(0.729) 
0.032 
(0.058)* 
Efficiency      
Bed occupancy rate -0.020 
(0.857) 
-0.012 
(0.952) 
-0.083 
(0.283) 
-0.042 
(0.621) 
-0.024 
(0.205) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 0.047 
(0.435) 
-0.088 
(0.252) 
-0.008 
(0.991) 
-0.015 
(0.909) 
-0.020 
(0.290) 
Reference cost index -0.090 
(0.219) 
-0.097 
(0.184) 
-0.065 
(0.390) 
-0.038 
(0.648) 
-0.066 
(0.000)*** 
Elective reference cost index 0.028 
(0.603) 
-0.075 
(0.317) 
-0.059 
(0.439) 
-0.057 
(0.458) 
-0.020 
(0.295) 
Non-elective reference cost index -0.152 
(0.032)** 
-0.139 
(0.050)* 
-0.152 
(0.033)** 
-0.082 
(0.257) 
-0.101 
(0.000)*** 
Reference cost index for hip replacement -0.069 
(0.397) 
-0.068 
(0.396) 
0.040 
(0.503) 
0.025 
(0.645) 
0.007 
(0.609) 
Residuals are computed estimating a model, by OLS, which controls for population density, proportion of elderly 
individuals, proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion 
of households with property house, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, 
proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, 
specialist hospital. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence 
of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. The statistic in year 2012-13 and 2013-
14 is therefore omitted. The statistic for all years is obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. 
p-values (in parentheses) are calculated assuming a normal distribution of the indicator; *** p-value<0.01, ** p-
value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A9  W Likelihood Ratio test to compare spatial lag and SAC model 
Indicator Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE 
Quality           
     Clinical      
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (0.687) (0.560) (0.419) (0.556) (0.363) 
Hip fracture mortality rate (0.348) (0.779) (0.078)* (0.189) (0.333) 
Stroke mortality rate (0.201) (0.570) (0.524) (0.795) (0.766) 
Emergency readmission rate (0.659) (0.087)*   (0.816) 
     Patient reported      
Average health change after hip replacement (0.491) (0.831) (0.671) (0.408) (0.643) 
Overall patient satisfaction (0.045)** (0.550) (0.509) (0.397) (0.726) 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness (0.968) (0.580) (0.431) (0.586) (0.793) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement (0.453) (0.790) (0.353) (0.705) (0.815) 
Efficiency      
Bed occupancy rate (0.200) (0.895) (0.184) (0.989) (0.616) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations (0.015)** (0.705) (0.035)** (0.075)* (0.001)*** 
Reference cost index (0.201) (0.151) (0.428) (0.338) (0.928) 
Elective reference cost index (0.241) (0.504) (0.337) (0.231) (0.020)** 
Non-elective reference cost index (0.121) (0.033)** (0.075)* (0.313) (0.324) 
Reference cost index for hip replacement (0.180) (0.632) (0.850) (0.675) (0.995) 
Null hypothesis: the spatial lag model is nested in the SAC model 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A10  W Spatial lag model for the quality indicators allowing for spatially lagged efficiency 
Variable  Quality indicators 
 SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality 
Readm. Health 
change 
hip repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
0.212 
(0.043)** 
0.016 
(0.891) 
-0.156 
(0.156) 
0.203 
(0.047)** 
-0.006 
(0.958) 
0.047 
(0.568) 
-0.016 
(0.873) 
0.035 
(0.719) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.281 
(0.142) 
-0.044 
(0.372) 
0.161 
(0.014)** 
0.022 
(0.411) 
-0.001 
(0.341) 
-0.078 
(0.102) 
-0.004 
(0.923) 
0.006 
(0.902) 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.154 
(0.420) 
0.014 
(0.775) 
0.002 
(0.972) 
0.033 
(0.132) 
-0.001 
(0.060)* 
0.015 
(0.745) 
-0.067 
(0.116) 
0.031 
(0.502) 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
-1
2
 
0.159 
(0.130) 
0.094 
(0.403) 
-0.176 
(0.132) 
0.117 
(0.254) 
-0.064 
(0.606) 
0.061 
(0.460) 
-0.054 
(0.565) 
0.075 
(0.405) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.495 
(0.019)** 
0.026 
(0.632) 
0.038 
(0.698) 
0.051 
(0.005)*** 
-0.001 
(0.133) 
-0.069 
(0.171) 
-0.079 
(0.071)* 
-0.051 
(0.323) 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.070 
(0.723) 
-0.067 
(0.196) 
0.017 
(0.846) 
0.017 
(0.438) 
-0.001 
(0.383) 
-0.037 
(0.444) 
-0.080 
(0.058)* 
-0.090 
(0.070)* 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
2
-1
3
 
0.098 
(0.328) 
-0.199 
(0.085)* 
-0.189 
(0.097)* 
0.091 
(0.327) 
-0.157 
(0.207) 
0.003 
(0.971) 
-0.082 
(0.371) 
-0.130 
(0.163) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.551 
(0.004)*** 
0.0004 
(0.995) 
-0.057 
(0.521) 
0.018 
(0.351) 
0.000001 
(0.999) 
-0.063 
(0.064)* 
-0.048 
(0.222) 
-0.102 
(0.028)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.040 
(0.812) 
-0.023 
(0.682) 
-0.137 
(0.080)* 
0.008 
(0.625) 
-0.0004 
(0.482) 
-0.060 
(0.142) 
-0.089 
(0.065)* 
-0.134 
(0.015)** 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
3
-1
4
 
0.156 
(0.164) 
-0.205 
(0.083)* 
-0.305 
(0.013)** 
0.092 
(0.351) 
-0.195 
(0.082)* 
0.084 
(0.349) 
0.044 
(0.624) 
0.029 
(0.761) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.180 
(0.352) 
0.024 
(0.590) 
0.106 
(0.212) 
0.021 
(0.362) 
-0.001 
(0.371) 
-0.039 
(0.312) 
-0.072 
(0.080)* 
-0.095 
(0.064)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.160 
(0.378) 
-0.040 
(0.346) 
0.059 
(0.465) 
-0.036 
(0.092)* 
-0.0005 
(0.367) 
-0.026 
(0.550) 
-0.081 
(0.084)* 
-0.061 
(0.296) 
Spatial lag 
F
E
 
0.170 
(0.001)*** 
-0.040 
(0.468) 
-0.060 
(0.279) 
0.065 
(0.233) 
-0.039 
(0.505) 
0.084 
(0.113) 
-0.069 
(0.218) 
-0.032 
(0.552) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
-0.051 
(0.626) 
0.004 
(0.924) 
-0.047 
(0.456) 
0.014 
(0.082)* 
-0.001 
(0.225) 
-0.060 
(0.109) 
-0.027 
(0.347) 
-0.071 
(0.089)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.049 
(0.563) 
-0.008 
(0.816) 
-0.116 
(0.028)** 
0.009 
(0.463) 
0.0003 
(0.515) 
-0.006 
(0.856) 
-0.020 
(0.431) 
0.021 
(0.562) 
Spatial lag 
R
E
 
0.181 
(0.000)*** 
-0.021 
(0.710) 
-0.057 
(0.316) 
0.114 
(0.028)** 
-0.035 
(0.557) 
0.092 
(0.052)* 
-0.045 
(0.382) 
-0.001 
(0.986) 
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.091 
(0.374) 
0.015 
(0.622) 
0.004 
(0.933) 
0.018 
(0.044)** 
-0.001 
(0.093)* 
-0.060 
(0.025)** 
-0.043 
(0.083)* 
-0.067 
(0.031)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.051 
(0.544) 
-0.007 
(0.791) 
-0.070 
(0.116) 
0.004 
(0.713) 
-0.001 
(0.092)* 
-0.032 
(0.223) 
-0.044 
(0.064)* 
-0.035 
(0.251) 
Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A11  W Spatial lag model for the efficiency indicators allowing for spatially lagged quality 
Variable  Efficiency indicators 
 Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
Unit cost of 
hip repl. 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
-0.054 
(0.619)  
0.084 
(0.424)  
-0.029 
(0.806)  
0.016 
(0.886)  
-0.064 
(0.572)  
-0.122 
(0.292)  
Spatially lagged SHMI -0.021 
(0.817)  
-0.002 
(0.773)  
-0.256 
(0.030)** 
-0.494 
(0.032)** 
-0.615 
(0.004)*** 
0.00002 
(0.548)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.639 
(0.026)** 
0.006 
(0.785)  
-0.573 
(0.090)* 
-0.966 
(0.172)  
-1.582 
(0.014)** 
0.0001 
(0.221)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
-1
2
 
-0.114 
(0.333)  
-0.024 
(0.839)  
-0.038 
(0.742)  
0.034 
(0.757)  
-0.081 
(0.468)  
-0.230 
(0.039)** 
Spatially lagged SHMI -0.113 
(0.248)  
-0.005 
(0.415)  
-0.157 
(0.169)  
-0.540 
(0.006)*** 
-0.415 
(0.037)** 
0.00003 
(0.239)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-1.083 
(0.000)*** 
0.003 
(0.866)  
-0.185 
(0.566)  
-0.627 
(0.261)  
-0.512 
(0.357)  
0.00009 
(0.215)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
2
-1
3
 
-0.097 
(0.401)  
0.125 
(0.246)  
-0.124 
(0.286)  
0.030 
(0.787)  
-0.145 
(0.189)  
-0.011 
(0.925)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 0.037 
(0.705)  
-0.004 
(0.574)  
-0.088 
(0.478)  
-0.257 
(0.183)  
-0.367 
(0.047)** 
0.00003 
(0.199)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.427 
(0.242)  
0.041 
(0.120)  
-0.259 
(0.579)  
-1.094 
(0.131)  
-0.714 
(0.308)  
-0.00010 
(0.325)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
3
-1
4
 
0.049 
(0.641)  
0.040 
(0.713)  
0.060 
(0.609)  
-0.049 
(0.682)  
-0.018 
(0.884)  
0.060 
(0.613)  
Spatially lagged SHMI -0.203 
(0.049)** 
-0.009 
(0.209)  
-0.053 
(0.717)  
-0.274 
(0.248)  
-0.395 
(0.075)* 
-0.00001 
(0.691)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.290 
(0.331)  
-0.026 
(0.199)  
0.035 
(0.933)  
-0.112 
(0.872)  
-0.299 
(0.635)  
0.00004 
(0.591)  
Spatial lag 
F
E
 
-0.090 
(0.136)  
0.018 
(0.736)  
0.029 
(0.607)  
0.046 
(0.430)  
-0.076 
(0.179)  
-0.095 
(0.091)* 
Spatially lagged SHMI 0.003 
(0.954)  
0.010 
(0.017)** 
0.077 
(0.233)  
-0.051 
(0.685)  
0.077 
(0.537)  
0.00003 
(0.115)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.280 
(0.064)* 
-0.006 
(0.560)  
0.050 
(0.758)  
0.403 
(0.214)  
0.434 
(0.168)  
0.00003 
(0.552)  
Spatial lag 
R
E
 
-0.053 
(0.367)  
0.050 
(0.353)  
0.090 
(0.103)  
0.059 
(0.297)  
0.025 
(0.647)  
-0.069 
(0.220)  
Spatially lagged SHMI -0.031 
(0.561)  
0.003 
(0.485)  
0.024 
(0.713)  
-0.183 
(0.116)  
-0.171 
(0.150)  
0.00002 
(0.203)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.512 
(0.001)*** 
-0.001 
(0.929)  
-0.144 
(0.403)  
-0.025 
(0.937)  
-0.364 
(0.257)  
0.00003 
(0.522)  
Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A12  W ML estimates of the spatial lag when hospitals compete within a radius of 60 km 
Indicator  
Monop 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE RE 
Quality               
     Clinical               
Summary Hospital-level Mortality 
Indicator 
1 0.288 
(0.018)** 
0.183 
(0.144) 
0.199 
(0.087)* 
0.186 
(0.166) 
0.197 
(0.008)*** 
0.222 
(0.001)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 1 -0.318 
(0.048)** 
-0.125 
(0.509) 
-0.279 
(0.093)* 
-0.117 
(0.508) 
-0.113 
(0.187) 
-0.097 
(0.247) 
Stroke mortality rate 1 -0.050 
(0.738) 
-0.236 
(0.186) 
-0.196 
(0.290) 
-0.210 
(0.300) 
-0.069 
(0.403) 
-0.005 
(0.951) 
Emergency readmission rate 1 0.105 
(0.428) 
0.159 
(0.211) 
  0.085 
(0.227) 
0.156 
(0.022)** 
     Patient reported        
Average health change after hip 
replacement 
1 0.009 
(0.962) 
-0.150 
(0.419) 
-0.353 
(0.034)** 
-0.273 
(0.153) 
-0.129 
(0.174) 
-0.067 
(0.456) 
Overall patient satisfaction 1 0.227 
(0.034)** 
0.148 
(0.167) 
0.168 
(0.126) 
0.320 
(0.003)*** 
0.240 
(0.000)*** 
0.248 
(0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness 
1 0.175 
(0.172) 
0.113 
(0.378) 
0.084 
(0.524) 
0.231 
(0.055)* 
0.091 
(0.230) 
0.124 
(0.081)* 
Patient satisfaction on decision 
involvement 
1 0.174 
(0.136) 
0.143 
(0.255) 
0.049 
(0.703) 
0.237 
(0.059)* 
0.050 
(0.516) 
0.125 
(0.071)* 
Efficiency        
Bed occupancy rate 1 0.020 
(0.892) 
-0.003 
(0.986) 
-0.251 
(0.069)* 
-0.067 
(0.636) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
0.002 
(0.976) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 1 0.195 
(0.153) 
0.005 
(0.975) 
0.094 
(0.511) 
0.107 
(0.441) 
0.128 
(0.080)* 
0.141 
(0.046)** 
Reference cost index 1 -0.081 
(0.504) 
-0.038 
(0.744) 
-0.066 
(0.634) 
0.091 
(0.459) 
-0.013 
(0.866) 
0.052 
(0.452) 
Elective reference cost index 1 0.103 
(0.406) 
-0.027 
(0.828) 
-0.042 
(0.750) 
0.186 
(0.171) 
-0.126 
(0.066)* 
-0.043 
(0.527) 
Non-elective reference cost index 1 -0.054 
(0.705) 
0.127 
(0.306) 
-0.152 
(0.305) 
-0.101 
(0.479) 
-0.107 
(0.184) 
0.008 
(0.909) 
Reference cost index for hip 
replacement 
1 0.050 
(0.737) 
0.057 
(0.704) 
0.208 
(0.170) 
0.076 
(0.636) 
-0.080 
(0.374) 
0.031 
(0.706) 
Monop = monopolist hospitals (hospitals without rivals within a radius of 60 km), which are removed from the sample 
Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals in 
good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, 
foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist 
hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 
are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. In addition, data on hospital staff are available 
from 2010-11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the 
proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1 
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Table A13  W ML estimates of the spatial lag when hospitals compete within a radius of 90 km 
Indicator  
Monop 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 FE RE 
Quality               
     Clinical               
Summary Hospital-level Mortality 
Indicator 
0 0.294 
(0.057)* 
0.255 
(0.098)* 
0.148 
(0.304)  
0.047 
(0.771)  
0.270 
(0.005)*** 
0.264 
(0.002)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 1 -0.310 
(0.197)  
-0.265 
(0.315)  
-0.252 
(0.309)  
0.012 
(0.958)  
-0.127 
(0.283)  
-0.067 
(0.558)  
Stroke mortality rate 0 -0.145 
(0.439)  
-0.129 
(0.587)  
-0.214 
(0.268)  
-0.463 
(0.098)* 
-0.061 
(0.571)  
0.032 
(0.755)  
Emergency readmission rate 0 0.102 
(0.499)  
0.147 
(0.326)  
  
  
  
  
0.082 
(0.326)  
0.160 
(0.045)** 
     Patient reported               
Average health change after hip 
replacement 
0 -0.254 
(0.243)  
-0.347 
(0.182)  
-0.289 
(0.212)  
-0.323 
(0.190)  
-0.235 
(0.061)* 
-0.149 
(0.205)  
Overall patient satisfaction 0 0.235 
(0.061)* 
0.230 
(0.055)* 
0.208 
(0.104)  
0.349 
(0.007)*** 
0.369 
(0.000)*** 
0.333 
(0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness 
0 0.058 
(0.715)  
0.033 
(0.831)  
0.028 
(0.857)  
0.164 
(0.266)  
-0.003 
(0.975)  
0.042 
(0.651)  
Patient satisfaction on decision 
involvement 
0 0.164 
(0.242)  
0.181 
(0.211)  
0.038 
(0.805)  
0.292 
(0.047)** 
0.078 
(0.404)  
0.154 
(0.060)* 
Efficiency               
Bed occupancy rate 0 0.114 
(0.518)  
-0.057 
(0.770)  
-0.381 
(0.029)** 
-0.023 
(0.897)  
0.018 
(0.843)  
0.026 
(0.769)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 0 0.201 
(0.199)  
0.006 
(0.975)  
0.057 
(0.747)  
0.072 
(0.674)  
0.117 
(0.213)  
0.137 
(0.122)  
Reference cost index 0 -0.064 
(0.620)  
-0.082 
(0.508)  
0.058 
(0.708)  
0.169 
(0.200)  
-0.037 
(0.687)  
0.055 
(0.489)  
Elective reference cost index 0 0.113 
(0.431)  
-0.123 
(0.390)  
-0.005 
(0.973)  
0.177 
(0.236)  
-0.174 
(0.031)** 
-0.072 
(0.353)  
Non-elective reference cost index 0 -0.017 
(0.910)  
0.178 
(0.175)  
-0.026 
(0.879)  
-0.123 
(0.457)  
-0.147 
(0.138)  
0.034 
(0.684)  
Reference cost index for hip 
replacement 
0 0.053 
(0.767)  
0.090 
(0.629)  
0.204 
(0.281)  
0.003 
(0.990)  
-0.144 
(0.235)  
0.012 
(0.913)  
Monop = monopolist hospitals (hospitals without rivals within a radius of 90 km), which are removed from the sample 
Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals in 
good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, 
foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist 
hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 
are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008-09 to 2011-12. In addition, data on hospital staff are 
available from 2010-11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, 
the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1 
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Table A14  W First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using quality indicators 
Regressors  SHMI Hip fract. 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
IV
 1
 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
-1
4
 0.393 
(0.000)*** 
0.320 
(0.000)*** 
0.796 
(0.000)*** 
0.600 
(0.000)*** 
0.880 
(0.000)*** 
0.784 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
39.70 14.30 101.60 159.30 234.30 145.80 
IV
 2
 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 -4.629 
(0.000)*** 
  
  
0.604 
(0.000)*** 
-2.583 
(0.000)*** 
-1.616 
(0.000)*** 
-1.665 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
14.96   45.24 118.70 65.30 44.70 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
1
-1
2
 -3.964 
(0.000)*** 
  
  
0.514 
(0.000)*** 
-2.658 
(0.000)*** 
-1.495 
(0.000)*** 
-1.845 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
20.33   22.85 107.20 49.00 49.60 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
2
-1
3
 -2.224 
(0.004)*** 
  
  
  
  
-1.844 
(0.000)*** 
-1.638 
(0.000)*** 
-1.876 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
7.49     85.10 65.40 51.50 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
-1
4
 -1.972 
(0.002)*** 
  
  
  
  
-1.902 
(0.000)*** 
-1.657 
(0.000)*** 
-1.985 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
8.69     88.00 54.70 62.80 
IV 1 = IV strategy using the three-year lagged spatial lag of the dependent variable as instrument (WYt-3). 
IV 2 = IV strategy using a spatially lagged cost shifter as instrument (WZ). The instruments for the IV 2 strategy are: (spatially) 
lagged proportion of consultants for the lagged SHMI mortality rate; lagged proportion of junior doctors in training for lagged 
emergency readmission rate, lagged overall patient satisfaction, lagged patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness, and lagged 
patient satisfaction on decision involvement. 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 20% 
maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of 
individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, 
number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are included in the first stage of the 
2SLS estimator. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011-12. For IV 1, the estimate refers to the latest 
available year (2011-12) and not to 2013-14. For IV 2, estimates in year 2012-13 and 2013-14 are omitted. 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, IV 1 and IV 2's estimates are omitted because of the 
absence of valid instruments. Similarly, IV 2's estimates are omitted for hip fracture mortality. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A15  W First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using efficiency indicators 
Regressors  Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for hip 
repl. 
IV
 1
 
I stage coefficient on 
the instrument 
2
0
1
3
-1
4
 0.616 
(0.000)*** 
0.480 
(0.000)*** 
0.704 
(0.000)*** 
0.380 
(0.000)*** 
0.483 
(0.000)*** 
0.291 
(0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-
Donald) statistic 
113.70 35.60 177.60 53.30 51.30 23.45 
IV
 2
 
I stage coefficient on 
the instrument 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 6.160 
(0.000)*** 
0.074 
(0.400)  
-2.328 
(0.000)*** 
-3.949 
(0.000)*** 
-4.924 
(0.000)*** 
  
  
I stage F (Cragg-
Donald) statistic 
18.12 0.63 14.30 11.37 22.73   
I stage coefficient on 
the instrument 
2
0
1
1
-1
2
 4.387 
(0.000)*** 
0.119 
(0.064)* 
-3.124 
(0.000)*** 
-4.305 
(0.000)*** 
-6.347 
(0.000)*** 
  
  
I stage F (Cragg-
Donald) statistic 
12.77 3.04 29.54 16.18 36.64   
I stage coefficient on 
the instrument 
2
0
1
2
-1
3
 5.383 
(0.000)*** 
0.362 
(0.000)*** 
-1.850 
(0.001)*** 
-3.292 
(0.000)*** 
-3.380 
(0.000)*** 
  
  
I stage F (Cragg-
Donald) statistic 
11.59 13.03 10.30 12.39 11.81   
I stage coefficient on 
the instrument 
2
0
1
3
-1
4
 4.267 
(0.000)*** 
0.347 
(0.000)*** 
-1.907 
(0.000)*** 
-1.456 
(0.069)* 
-2.993 
(0.001)*** 
  
  
I stage F (Cragg-
Donald) statistic 
11.12 17.67 11.14 2.95 9.72   
IV 1 = IV strategy using the three-year lagged spatial lag of the dependent variable as instrument (WYt-3). 
IV 2 = IV strategy using a spatially lagged cost shifter as instrument (WZ). The instruments for the IV 2 strategy are: spatially 
lagged proportion of consultants for lagged reference cost index, lagged elective and non-elective reference cost index; lagged 
number of managers for lagged bed occupancy rate and lagged rate of cancelled elective operations. 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 20% 
maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed or 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of 
individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of 
consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are included in the first 
stage of the 2SLS estimator. 
IV 2's estimates are omitted for the RCI for hip replacement because of the absence of a valid instrument. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A16  W F-test to study the exclusion restriction assumption of WZ 
 
Indicator 
 
Instrument 
F-test on WZ in main regression 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Quality          
     Clinical          
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator Lagged proportion of consultants (0.064)* (0.175) (0.739) (0.490) 
Emergency readmission rate Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.149) (0.240)   
     Patient reported      
Overall patient satisfaction Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.695) (0.723) (0.698) (0.111) 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.322) (0.588) (0.946) (0.910) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.024)** (0.173) (0.721) (0.436) 
Efficiency      
Bed occupancy rate Lagged number of managers (0.617) (0.946) (0.542) (0.594) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations Lagged number of managers (0.739) (0.598) (0.498) (0.204) 
Reference cost index Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.402) (0.666) (0.734) (0.3) 
Elective RCI Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.016) (0.086) (0.141) (0.097) 
Non-elective RCI Lagged prop. of junior doctors in training (0.883) (0.091) (0.277) (0.763) 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A17  W Comparison of the results in Gravelle et al. (2014b) and in our study 
 
Indicator 
 GSS (2014)  Our study 
 2009-10  2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
 
 
Overall mortality 
 
(1) 
0.276 
(0.004)*** 
  
0.377 
(0.000)*** 
0.260 
(0.008)*** 
0.162 
(0.106)  
0.241 
(0.027)** 
 
(2) 
0.234 
(0.019)** 
  0.314 
(0.001)*** 
0.214 
(0.036)** 
0.105 
(0.304)  
0.173 
(0.119)  
 
 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
 
(1) 
0.028 
(0.807)  
  0.118 
(0.286)  
0.103 
(0.374)  
-0.121 
(0.283)  
-0.105 
(0.370)  
 
(2) 
-0.066 
(0.580)  
  -0.019 
(0.868)  
0.093 
(0.422)  
-0.218 
(0.054)* 
-0.203 
(0.087)* 
 
 
Stroke mortality rate 
 
(1) 
0.179 
(0.100)* 
  -0.037 
(0.748)  
-0.172 
(0.143)  
-0.123 
(0.284)  
-0.291 
(0.015)** 
 
(2) 
0.147 
(0.189)  
  -0.127 
(0.265)  
-0.203 
(0.083)* 
-0.163 
(0.162)  
-0.316 
(0.009)*** 
 
 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
 
(1) 
0.179 
(0.070)* 
  -0.003 
(0.976)  
-0.015 
(0.869)  
-0.060 
(0.538)  
0.045 
(0.622)  
 
(2) 
0.171 
(0.077)* 
  -0.045 
(0.633)  
-0.030 
(0.740)  
-0.111 
(0.248)  
0.009 
(0.918)  
 
 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
 
(1) 
0.245 
(0.012)** 
  0.092 
(0.272)  
0.068 
(0.407)  
-0.022 
(0.792)  
0.060 
(0.504)  
 
(2) 
0.167 
(0.102)  
  0.005 
(0.953)  
-0.038 
(0.649)  
-0.087 
(0.317)  
-0.031 
(0.736)  
GSS (2014) = Gravelle at al. (2014b). 
Specification (1) controls for: number of rivals, teaching trusts, foundation trusts, specialist hospitals, number of patients, market 
forces factor, population density, London trusts. 
Specification (2) controls for all covariates in (1) and for: proportion of elderly individuals, proportion of individuals employed and 
looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of households with property house, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health. 
The specialist dummy is omitted if the quality indicator's sample does not include specialist hospitals, i.e. for all indicators included in 
Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and for SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality rate. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
 
 
